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1. Introduction 
Most studies of poverty and income inequality focus exclusively on cash income and omit the value of 
public services. Smeeding et al. (1993; p 230) suggest that this practice may be due to the fact that 
“the problems inherent in the measurement, valuation, and imputation of non-cash income to 
individual households on the basis of micro data files are formidable.” Nevertheless, the conventional 
focus on cash income yields an incomplete and perhaps misleading picture of the distribution of 
economic well-being, not least because about half of welfare state transfers in developed countries are 
in-kind benefits such as health insurance, education and other services (Garfinkel et al., 2006). 
 
As the tax burden levied on households represent a deduction from their disposable income, it is 
important to account for the services which governments provide to households through these taxes. 
The omission of public services from the definition of income may call into question the validity of 
income comparisons across population subgroups, over time, and between countries. Furthermore, this 
omission can have important policy implications given the wide range of policies that aim to fight 
poverty and reduce inequality. For these reasons, the Canberra Group (Expert Group on Household 
Income Statistics, 2001) and Atkinson et al. (2002) have expressed the need for more research on the 
distributional impact of public services. Definition and measurement of public in-kind benefits require 
solutions of conceptual as well as practical problems, which have been raised and explored in a 
number of studies.1 While these studies represent a significant step forward, our aim is to further 
develop a framework for evaluating the distributional impact of public services.  
 
Extended income. The term extended income denotes the sum of disposable cash income and non-cash 
income, where non-cash income accounts for the value of local public services received by different 
individuals and households. The measurement of non-cash income involves three steps: Valuation, 
allocation, and adjustment for differences in needs through the use of equivalence scales. Our paper 
departs from the previous literature in that a model of local government spending behaviour forms the 
basis for each step. This framework therefore provides a coherent framework for evaluating the 
distributional impact of public services.  
 
                                                     
1 See e.g. Smeeding (1977), Ruggles and O’Higgins (1981), Gemmell (1985), Smeeding et al. (1993), Evandrou et al. (1993), 
Ruggeri et al. (1994), Slesnick (1996), Antoninis and Tsakloglou (2001) and Garfinkel et al. (2006). 
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Valuation and allocation. From a model of local government behaviour, we derive a linear 
expenditure system that proves useful in explaining differences in spending of municipalities across 
sectors and between population subgroups. In particular, the allocation of public service expenditure to 
households is based on estimates of sector-specific minimum quantities assigned to different target 
groups. These estimates are identified from information on sector-specific expenditures and the 
demographic characteristics of the population in each municipality. The estimation of the model is 
based on detailed local government accounts and community characteristics for Norwegian 
municipalities.  
 
In our main analysis, we follow the previous literature closely in valuating public services at the cost 
of their provision. However, we perform a sensitivity analysis in which the value of public services is 
adjusted by estimated price indices that account for variation in production costs across municipalities, 
in line with the suggestions of Aaberge and Langørgen (2006). 
 
Needs adjustment. The importance of accounting for needs and economies of scale in households’ in 
analyses of cash income distributions is universally acknowledged. As argued by Radner (1997), 
however, equivalence scales designed to account for needs and economies of scale in cash income are 
not necessarily appropriate when analyzing extended income. For instance, the elderly tend to utilize 
health services more often than younger people due to different health status, and children have a 
genuine need for education. As a consequence, studies using the equivalence scales designed for cash 
income risk overestimating the equivalent incomes of groups with relatively high needs for public 
services.  A contribution of this paper is to relax the assumption that the relative needs of different 
subgroups remain unchanged when the definition of income changes. 
 
To derive an equivalence scale for extended income, we use the minimum expenditures identified in 
the spending model of the local governments as a basis for assessing the relative needs for public 
services of different target groups. The justification of this approach is that the estimated minimum 
expenditures can be considered as a result of central government regulations, expert opinion, and/or a 
consensus among local governments about how much spending the different target groups need, given 
the budget constraint that the municipalities face. The fact that the equivalence scale is based on the 
same model used to derive the allocation method does not imply that the allocated non-cash income is 
exactly offset by the needs of the different target groups. The reasons are threefold. First, the 
recipients live in different municipalities which have different economic capacity to produce public 
services. Second, local governments have discretion in their spending across service sectors, as well as 
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in spending priorities on different target groups. And third, since the needs-adjusted equivalence scale 
is defined as a weighted average of the scale for cash income and the scale for non-cash income, the 
needs adjustment is a function of both cash and non-cash income. This means that individuals who are 
equal with respect to needs for public services and who belong to the same municipality, are affected 
differently by the needs adjustment if their cash incomes differ. 
 
The Norwegian case. Norway emerges as an interesting country for studying the distributional impact 
of local public services for reasons beyond data availability and quality. First of all, Norway is a 
relatively large country with a dispersed population and relatively large public sector where local 
governments play an important role in the provision of public services. In Norway, the central 
government has introduced an equalization program in the grant system for local governments. 
However, important income components such as income from hydroelectric power plants and regional 
development transfers are not accounted for in the equalization scheme. Moreover, there is variation in 
local government spending across service sectors, as well as in spending priorities on different target 
groups (Aaberge and Langørgen, 2003). Consequently, some municipalities may be more effective 
than others in fighting poverty and reducing inequality, either because they can provide a generally 
higher level of services or because they are targeting vulnerable groups. 
 
Outline. Section 2 discusses the model of local government spending behaviour and the methods used 
to valuate and allocate public services, before justifying the equivalence scales for non-cash income 
and extended income. Section 3 describes the empirical implementation of these methods and reports 
estimation results from the model of local government spending. Section 4 presents empirical results 
showing the impact of local public services on poverty and income inequality estimates, before 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Local public services 
This section describes the model of local government spending behaviour, before presenting the 
methods used to valuate and allocate public services and derive the equivalence scales for non-cash 
income and extended income. 
 
It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the distributional impact of 
public services that are not provided by local governments, most notably central government 
administration and infrastructure, defence, police services, secondary and post-secondary education, 
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and public hospitals. Though figuring out how to value, allocate, and needs adjust those services is 
important, it is left for future research. 
2.1. Spending behaviour of local governments  
As was demonstrated by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003), the linear expenditure system (LES) proves 
helpful in explaining differences in the spending behaviour of Norwegian municipalities, provided that 
account is taken for heterogeneity in expenditure needs and in local preferences for allocation of 
income to different services. To account for heterogeneity in preferences over service sectors and 
target groups of local governments, we use the following specification of a Stone-Geary utility 
function,  
(2.1) 
1 1
log ,
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ij ij
ij
i j ij
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V
γβ
γ
= =
 −
=      
where V is utility of the local government, and ijx  is the production of service i per person of target 
group j. The parameter ijγ  is interpreted as the minimum quantity per person of service i targeted to 
group j and can also be considered as a measure of the local government’s assessment of the need for 
different services targeted to different population subgroups. The parameter ijβ  is interpreted as the 
marginal budget share for spending on group j in service sector i. 
 
When the local government is assumed to allocate resources both to different service sectors and to 
different target groups, the budget constraint can be specified as 
(2.2) 
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where y is total per capita income of the local government, iπ  is the cost per unit in the production of 
service i, jz  is the population share that belongs to target group j and ij i iju xπ=  is the spending per 
person on service i for target group j. Thus, ij ju z  is spending of type i targeted to group j measured per 
person in the population. By maximizing utility in (2.1) subject to the budget constraint (2.2), we 
obtain the following linear expenditure system,  
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where 
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s k
i ij j
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y zπ γ
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−  is discretionary income, that is, the income remaining when the minimum 
expenditures have been covered. Minimum expenditure in sector i targeted to group j is defined by 
i ij jzπ γ . Exclusion restrictions of the type 0ijγ =  capture the fact that each target group does not 
necessarily receive all services. 
 
Since allocation of spending to target groups, iju , is normally not reported in accounting data we 
identify the parameters of the model by imposing the following multiplicative structure on the 
marginal budget shares, 
(2.4) 
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where iβ  is the marginal budget share for service sector i, and ijθ  is the share of sector-specific 
discretionary income in service sector i that is allocated to target group j. Inserting (2.4) into (2.3) and 
aggregating across target groups within each service sector yield 
(2.5) 
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where 
1
k
i ij jj
u u z
=
=  is expenditure (per capita) in service sector i, which is reported in the 
accounting data of the municipalities. The total per capita minimum quantity in sector i is defined by 
1
k
i ij jj
zγ γ
=
= . Thus, owing to the additive properties of the linear expenditure system, it is possible 
to estimate minimum quantities for different target groups and different service sectors. By allowing 
the minimum quantity parameters ijγ  to vary across target groups, we obtain a flexible modelling 
framework that accounts for different needs for public services across different demographic groups. 
We also allow the unit cost parameters iπ  and the marginal budget share parameters iβ  to vary with 
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observed variables. However, for the purpose of identification we assume that certain variables affect 
unit costs but not minimum quantities. This assumption helps to clarify the distinction between unit 
costs and service needs of the population.2 Specifically, we introduce the following specification for 
the unit cost parameters: 
(2.6) 0 1 ( ) , 1,2,..., ,i i ih h h
h
p p i sπ π π = + − =    
where hp  is a variable that affects unit costs in at least one of the service sectors and hp  is the 
national mean of variable hp . For instance, we assume that settlement pattern and economies of scale 
affect unit costs, which means that small municipalities with a dispersed population are allowed to 
face different unit costs in service production compared to other municipalities. By contrast, the 
sector-specific minimum quantities ( iγ ) depend on population shares of different target groups which 
capture the local need for services such as child care, education and care for the elderly. 
 
Equation (2.6) is expressed in terms of variables measured as deviations from national average levels. 
Consequently, the parameter 0iπ  can be interpreted as the average price level in service sector i. 
Minimum quantities and unit costs are, however, only identified up to a multiplicative constant, since 
multiplying unit costs by a constant and dividing subsistence output by the same constant cannot be 
traced from the reduced form parameters of the model. Natural scales of measurement for output and 
unit costs of local public services are not available. However, since expenditures are defined by the 
product of output and unit costs an appropriate scale emerges by normalizing the average price levels 
to 1 ( 0 1, 1,2,...,i i sπ = = ). This means that unit cost iπ  is defined as a price index with the average for 
the entire country equal to 1. Moreover, it follows that service outputs are measured in money terms 
and are interpreted as monetary values of output for an average price level. Note, however, that the 
normalization of prices imposes no restrictions on the model other than a choice of measurement scale 
for prices and outputs.  
 
Heterogeneity in marginal budget shares is due to different preferences across municipalities for 
allocating discretionary income to service sectors. Let 
                                                     
2 Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) used a different approach by replacing the minimum expenditure terms with linear functions 
of observed municipality characteristics. 
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where ht  is a taste variable that affects the preferences for allocating discretionary income. For 
instance, the party composition of the local government council may influence such service priorities. 
This specification allows for different political priorities over service sectors across local 
governments. Such priorities are assumed to affect the allocation of discretionary income to services 
sectors, whereas the minimum quantities are assumed to be determined by variation in local needs that 
are reflected in the relative size of different target groups. 
2.2 Allocation method  
As noted above, the allocation of spending to different services is reported in local government 
accounts. Yet the allocation of spending to target groups is not observed, reflecting data availability in 
most countries. This means that marginal budget share ijθ  for different target groups are not identified. 
A feasible solution to this problem is to utilize the information captured by the minimum quantities ijγ  
to determine the relative priority of different target groups. By assuming that the sector-specific 
discretionary income is allocated to target groups by the same proportions as minimum expenditures, 
that is,    
(2.8) 
1
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the local government model is fully identified. Thus, the parameter ijθ  can be interpreted as the 
proportion of the minimum quantity (and minimum expenditure) in sector i received by target group j. 
Inserting (2.8), (2.4) and (2.5) in (2.3) gives the following allocation of spending to target groups  
(2.9) 
1
, 1,2,..., , 1,2,..., ,ij jij j ik
ij jj
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u z u i s j k
z
γ
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=
= = =  
which means that sector-specific spending is allocated to target groups by the same proportions as 
minimum quantities (and minimum expenditures). Note that the share of expenditure received by a 
target group is an increasing function of the target groups’s share of the population, as well as of the 
estimated minimum quantity per person in the target group. As is demonstrated by (2.9), estimates of 
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the target-group-specific expenditures iju  can be derived from estimates of the minimum quantities 
ijγ , and from data on sector-specific expenditures and proportions of the population belonging to 
various target groups. 
2.3 Equivalence scales 
Equivalence scales play an important role in analysis of inequality and poverty as a means for 
achieving interpersonal comparability of cash income. Both the methods for deriving equivalence 
scales and the normative assumptions made by them are subject to considerable debate. While 
theoretically justified equivalence scales can be constructed from the cost functions for households 
with different demographic characteristics, most empirical analysis typically use more pragmatic 
scales adjusting crudely for differences in household size and composition (see e.g. Coulter et. al. 
1992). In either case, the equivalence scales designed for cash income are not necessarily appropriate 
when analyzing extended income, because the receipt of public services (like education for children 
and care for the elderly) are associated with particular needs.3 If we were to use the equivalence scales 
designed for cash income on extended income, we risk overestimating the equivalent extended income 
for individuals with high needs for public services.  
 
To derive an equivalence scale for extended income, consider a social planner employing the 
minimum expenditures identified in the spending model of the local governments as a basis for 
assessing the relative needs of different target groups. The justification for this approach is that the 
estimated minimum expenditures can be considered as a result of central government regulations, 
expert opinion, or a consensus among local governments about how much spending the different target 
groups need, given the budget constraint that the municipalities face. Moreover, we assume that the 
social planner uses the same functional form for measuring individual well-being produced by public 
services as is used by local governments to decide the spending on public services.  
 
However, while the marginal budget share parameters of the utility function (2.1) of the local 
governments allow for heterogeneity in spending across sectors as well as across target groups, the 
aim of the social planner is to employ a social evaluation framework that treats individuals 
symmetrically and independent of where they live after adjusting for relevant non-income 
heterogeneity. Thus, we replace the marginal budget share parameters ijβ  of the utility function (2.1) 
                                                     
3 For example, the equivalence scales estimated by Jones and O’Donnell (1995) and Zaidi and Burchardt (2005) imply that 
the disable have relatively high needs, so their cash and non-cash incomes should be correspondingly adjusted when 
evaluating the distribution of extended income.  
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with parameters that solely depend on the group- and sector-specific minimum expenditures i ij jzπ γ .  
The following specification 
(2.10) 
0 1
, 0,1,..., , 1,2,..., ,i ij jij s k
i ij ji j
z
i s j k
z
π γβ
π γ
= =
= = =   
appears particular attractive since it captures the needs structure exhibited by the minimum quantity 
parameters. Note that sector 0 is added as a composite good that includes consumption financed by the 
cash income, where 0 jγ  is the minimum quantity of cash income per person for target group j and 0π  
represents the price index of private consumption. Next, by inserting (2.10) in (2.1) we get 
(2.11) 
0 1
log
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x
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γ
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which will be considered as the evaluation function of the social planner. The cost function of the 
social planner is given by 
(2.12) 
01 02,...,, 0 1 0 1
1 1
( , , ) min log .
sk
s k s k
i ij j ij ij
i ij j s kx x x i j i j iji ij ji j
z x
C w x z w
z
π γ γ
π
γπ γ= = = =
= =
  
− 
= ≥      
  π z  
where ( )1 2 kz ,z ,...,z=z  gives the relative distribution of the population on target groups. Thus, from 
the social planner’s point of view ( , , )C w π z  gives the minimum cost (per capita) to get welfare level 
w  for a population characterized by k target groups. By solving the minimization problem (2.12) we 
find that the cost function C admits the following decomposition 
(2.13) ( ) ( )
0 1
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s k
w
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i j
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Inserting (2.14) in (2.13) yields the following decomposition of the cost function  
(2.15) ( ) ( )
1
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Due to the Stone-Geary structure of the social evaluation function W defined by (2.11), it is 
straightforward to prove that ( , )jC w π  can be considered as a separate cost function for a member of 
target group j. The cost function jC  shows how much money the social planner has to spend on each 
person in target group j  to ensure that the social welfare level w is attained for each member of target 
group j ( 1 2j , ,...,k= ). Thus, the associated price-adjusted target group-specific equivalence scale 
jNPA  is defined by 
(2.16) 
( )
( )
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0 0 0
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s s s
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j s s s
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π
1
, 
where the reference target group r is a single adult below 67 years of age,4  and the (hypothetical) 
reference municipality is characterized by a price vector with all prices equal to 1. It follows from 
(2.16) that the equivalence scale jNPA  is independent of the income levels of the target groups.
5 Note 
that the jNPA  accounts for needs for public services as well as for needs for cash income. Since  
0 0
s s
j i ij ij
i i
π π γ γ
= =
=   can be interpreted as a target-group-specific price index and 
0 0
s s
j ij ir
i i
NA γ γ
= =
=   
as an average needs-adjusted equivalence scale, jNPA  admits the following convenient decomposition 
(2.17) j j jNPA NAπ=  . 
In the general case the equivalence scale depends on variation in the price level across municipalities. 
The reason for this is that residents in high-cost municipalities require higher spending to reach the 
same standard of living as residents in low-cost municipalities. To pin down the distributional impact 
of allowing for changes in the relative needs of subgroups when we move from cash to extended 
income, we assume that prices do not vary across municipalities, which means that j jNPA NA= . To 
assess the importance of allowing for variation in production costs, we will allow for differences in 
unit costs using the more general jNPA equivalence scale. 
 
Another convenient decomposition property of the equivalence scale defined by (2.16) is given by 
                                                     
4 Moreover, the reference household is assumed not to possess any of the characteristics that trigger additional expenditure 
needs, such as unemployment, refugee status, divorce or poverty. 
5 This structure, called independence of base utility, has previously been discussed by Lewbel (1989) and Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1993). 
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where jCI  is the equivalence scale for cash income, NCj is the scale for non-cash income, and rθ  is 
the weight that is given to cash income in the combined NPA scale for extended income. While the NC 
scale is a function of the minimum expenditures identified in the spending model of local 
governments, we will follow the previous literature in using a pragmatic scale for CI . In our main 
results, we will apply the much used EU scale for cash income, but as a robustness check we employ 
the OECD scale instead. The combined NA scale (and NPA scale) requires assessment of the weight 
rθ . The empirical implementation in Section 3.4 discusses two alternative methods for determining 
this parameter.  
 
The equivalence scales in equations (2.17) and (2.18) can be defined both on individual and household 
level. As there are no clear-cut economies of scale in the consumption of public non-cash income, 
such as education and health care, the local public services are treated as private goods in the NC scale 
for public services. The NC scale on the household level is computed by summation of individual 
scales over all individuals that belong to a given household. The parameter rθ  in equation (2.18) does 
not differ across individuals or municipalities. Thus, the parameter is not affected by aggregation over 
households. Since the EU scale is defined on the household level, it can be weighted together with the 
NC scale aggregated to the household level, using the parameter rθ  as the weight for cash income. It 
follows that economies of scale in consumption are included in the NA scale (and NPA scale) to the 
degree that the equivalence scale for cash income (the EU scale) accounts for economies of scale. A 
comparison of the EU scale and the estimated NA scales based on data from Norway is given in 
Section 4.2. 
3. Empirical implementation 
This section describes the empirical implementation of the methods outlined above using Norwegian 
data. We also outline the methods used to evaluate the income distribution. Specifically, Section 3.1 
describes the data and some definitional issues. Estimation results of the model for local government 
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spending are given in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes how the value of public services is allocated 
to individuals. Section 3.4 defines equivalent income measures that are utilized in the analysis of 
income distribution. Inequality measures and poverty thresholds are defined in Section 3.5.   
3.1 Data 
Population of study. Our analytical sample is based on administrative registers with household, 
geographic, and demographic information for the entire resident population of Norway in 2007. Table 
3.1 shows the population composition by demographic and geographic characteristics. Roughly four 
out of five people live in urban municipalities, including the capital Oslo. Furthermore, nearly three-
quarters of the population live as couples. In addition, immigrants make up almost one-tenth of the 
population.    
 
Table 3.1 Population of study 
Population group Population share (%) 
Single parents 9 
Couples with children 49 
Couples without children 19 
Singles, 44 years or below 7 
Singles, 45-66 years 5 
Singles, 67 years or above 6 
Household type 
Other households 5 
Urban 70 
Oslo 12 Centrality 
Rural 18 
Non-immigrants 91 
Ethnic origin 
Immigrants 9 
Population size (millions) 4.7 
 
Public services and expenditure. Local government accounts in Norway provide detailed information 
on sector-specific expenditure. Table 3.2 summarizes the differences in sector-specific per capita 
public spending across the 431 municipalities in Norway in 2007. We see that the largest expenditure 
component is care for the elderly and disabled (long-term care), closely followed by primary 
education. These two sectors account, on average, for more than half of the total expenditure of 
municipalities. We also note that there are considerable differences in per capita public spending 
across municipalities in all service sectors.  
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Table 3.2 Public spending per capita on different services across municipalities  
Public spending per capita 
Service sector 
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Administration 569 329 219 2 891 
Primary education 1 155 238 756 2 117 
Other education 84 49 5 557 
Child care 435 100 243 962 
Health care 253 127 108 967 
Social assistance 72 45 0 284 
Child protection 127 54 14 506 
Long-term care 1 500 468 633 5 066 
Culture 202 142 73 2 101 
Infrastructure 225 289 0 3 183 
All services 4 396 1 553 2 051 15 451 
Note: Numbers are calculated by averaging spending per capita across municipalities for each sector. 
All numbers are in Euros (exchange rate of 9 NOK per Euro is used).  
 
Table 3.4 shows our classification of local public services into ten different sectors, and the associated 
target groups. From the administrative registers, we can compute the population shares of different 
target groups in every municipality. We therefore have a one-to-one correspondence between our 
population of study and the population shares used in the estimation of the model of local government 
spending.  
 
The specification of target groups aims at producing mutually exclusive groups within each 
service sector. By not including partially overlapping target groups, we are able to avoid 
misleading double-counting of minimum quantities, while at the same time accounting 
properly for interaction effects pertaining to population subgroups that share more than one of 
the characteristics that are used by local governments to target the public services. 
 
Cash and extended income. Table 3.3 defines our cash income and extended income measure. 
We see that the cash income measure includes earnings, self-employment income, capital 
income, and public cash transfers, from which direct taxes are subtracted. We use the term 
extended income to denote the sum of cash income and the value of in-kind benefits provided 
through public services. The data on cash income is based on Tax Assessment Files, which 
are collected from tax records and other administrative registers, rather than interviews and 
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self-reporting methods. The coverage and reliability of Norwegian data on cash income are 
considered to be very high, as is documented by the fact that the quality of such national 
datasets of income received the highest rating in a data quality survey in the Luxembourg 
Income Study database (Atkinson et al., 1995).  
 
Table 3.3 Definition of cash income and extended income 
Market income      =  Employment income (earnings, self-employment income)  
+  Capital income (interest, stock dividends, sale of stocks) 
Total income         =  Market income 
+ Public cash transfers (e.g. old-age pension, unemployment and disability  
benefits, child benefits and single parents benefits, social assistance) 
Cash income         =  Total income – direct taxes  
Extended income  =  Cash income + non-cash income  
 
3.2 Estimation results 
The estimation of the model defined by (2.5)–(2.7) is based on detailed local government accounts and 
community characteristics for Norwegian municipalities in 2007. The model accounts for spending on 
the ten service sectors displayed in Table 3.4, and in the estimation we also include the budget surplus 
(net operating result) as a sector in the model. The budget surplus is treated as a residual sector, which 
means that the model is representing an extended linear expenditure system, see Lluch (1973). 
Expenditures are defined exclusive of user fees and employer payroll taxes, and are measured on a per 
capita basis in the model specification. We estimate the model simultaneously by the method of 
maximum likelihood. 
 
The minimum quantity parameters are displayed in Table 3.4, the unit cost parameters are displayed in 
Table 3.5, and Table A.1 in Appendix A presents estimates of the marginal budget share parameters. 
Importantly, the parameter estimates are statistically significant and of the expected signs.  
 
Minimum quantity parameters. Consider the parameter estimates reported in Table 3.4, showing the 
increase in minimum quantity when the target group is increased by one person. One main finding is 
that there is substantial variation in the minimum quantity estimates across target groups. Below we 
discuss the identified target groups and associated minimum quantities in each of the ten service 
sectors. 
17 
Table 3.4 Estimates of minimum quantity parameters 
Sector Function Target groups Parameter estimate 
T-
stat. 
R2-
adj. 
Administration 
All local 
administrative 
services  
All residents 251 10.42 0.88 
Primary 
education 
Ten years of 
primary 
education 
Population 6-12 years of age  
Population 13-15 years of age 
5 414 
8 694 
11.87 
9.16 
0.79 
Other education 
After-school 
education and 
adult 
education 
Population 6-15 years of age 
Recently domiciled refugees 20-59 years of 
age 
255 
6 202 
7.23 
7.71 
0.36 
Child care 
Municipal and 
publicly 
subsidized 
kindergartens 
Children 1-5 years with full-time employed 
parents 
Remaining children 1-5 years of age 
10 650 
4 405 
20.43 
13.73 
0.60 
Health care 
All health 
services 
provided by 
general 
practitioners 
All residents 124 11.14 0.75 
Social assistance 
Social services 
targeted 
towards 
disadvantaged 
individuals 
Poor and unemployed 16-59 years of age 
Remaining recently domiciled refugees 0-59 
years  
Remaining divorced or separated 16-59 
years 
17 030 
6 493 
 
1 258 
5.43 
10.40 
 
10.11 
0.54 
Child protection 
All services 
related to child 
protection 
Poor children 0-15 years with lone parent 
Poor children 0-15 years with couple parents 
Non-poor children 0-15 years with lone 
parent 
Non-poor children 0-15 years with couple 
parents 
3 893 
2 048 
2 115 
 
163 
3.79 
3.49 
4.64 
 
2.45 
0.13 
Long-term care 
Nursing 
homes and 
home care for 
the elderly and 
disabled 
Population 0-66 years of age 
Population 67-79 years of age 
Population 80-89 years of age 
Population 90 years and above 
Mentally disabled 16 years and above 
347 
2 721 
5 452 
14 655 
45 119 
4.33 
2.70 
2.92 
2.57 
12.05 
0.84 
Culture 
Sports, arts, 
museums, 
libraries, 
cinemas and 
churches 
All residents 91 8.38 0.67 
Infrastructure 
Water supply, 
road 
maintenance, 
sewage and 
refuse 
collection   
All residents 22 0.90 0.58 
Note: All parameter estimates are in Euros (a fixed exchange rate of 9 NOK per Euro is used). Number of 
observations = 378. 
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Consider first primary schools, which are compulsory for children 6–15 years of age. It follows that 
service provision increases as a function of the number of children in this age group. We also see that 
children aged 6–12 years receive not as much services as children aged 13–15 years. This difference is 
due to the fact that the latter group faces more extensive and demanding lessons, which requires 
teachers with higher qualifications. 
 
Local governments operate a few other education services that are not included in the sector for 
primary education. The service sector “Other education” includes day care facilities for 
schoolchildren, music schools, special schools and adult education. Except for adult education, the 
relevant group that benefits from “Other education” is the age group 6-15 years. Adult education is 
particularly directed toward recently domiciled refugees in the age group 20-59 years. Recently 
domiciled refugees include refugees who have resided in Norway less than five years. 
 
Moving on to the child-care sector, we see that the service provision increases in the population share 
of children in pre-school age (1-5 years). The target group is divided into children with and without 
full-time employed parents. The marginal cost is higher for the group with full-time employed parents, 
since these families depend more on professional day-care services, which contributes to higher 
demand for and coverage in kindergartens. 
 
Next, consider child protection sector, which includes investigation of alleged child abuse, orphan 
homes, foster care, adoption services, and services aimed at supporting at-risk families so they can 
remain intact. Children less than 16 years of age are the primary target group for child protection. The 
estimation results show that the risk and spending is highest among children that belong to a poor 
family with a lone parent. Risk and spending levels are intermediate for children that are poor with 
couple parents or non-poor with a lone parent. The lowest spending levels are found among children 
that are non-poor with couple parents. Poor families include those with incomes below half of median 
income, where incomes are defined by after-tax private incomes exclusive of social assistance cash 
transfers. In-kind benefits are not included in the income definition when defining poor families that 
are highly prone to receive some of the municipal services. 
 
A large share of spending in the social assistance sector is cash transfers to support families with 
insufficient means from other sources of income. The sector also includes some in-kind benefits that 
aim to prevent alcohol and drugs abuse and other social problems. The potential recipients are either 
poor, unemployed, refugees or divorced/separated, or possess different combinations of those 
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characteristics. To account for interaction effects between different characteristics, the potential 
recipients are divided into mutually exclusive target groups that include all possible combinations of 
the above mentioned characteristics. The estimates for each subgroup are used to identify target 
groups with high, intermediate and low risk and spending. The resulting target group classification 
shows that the poor who are also unemployed is a high-risk group for receiving social assistance. The 
second target group that receives intermediate spending per person is recently domiciled refugees. The 
third target group that receives a lower, although significant spending level, is the divorced and 
separated. 
 
Long-term care includes nursing homes, ambulant nurses and home care. The potential recipients are 
the elderly and disabled. Since elderly people have a higher probability of becoming recipients of 
long-term care, spending needs are higher for the elderly than for younger people. Subsistence output 
is increasing with age, and is highest for the elderly 90 years and above. By contrast, spending needs 
per person is much lower in the age group 0-66 years. However, the group of mentally disabled, which 
by and large is a subgroup of the age group 0-66 years, is included to account for the additional cost 
from being mentally disabled. This additional minimum expenditure is rather high, and is above 
45,000 Euros per person in the mentally disabled group. 
 
When it comes to administration, municipal health care, culture, and infrastructure, the target group is 
taken to be the whole population. The financing of local public health services is shared with the 
central government such that local governments pay for a basic capacity, whilst additional costs due to 
utilization and health care needs are financed through the national social security system. Thus the 
local government minimum quantity for health care does not vary as a function of socio-demographic 
variables. Similarly, for culture, administration and infrastructure, we have not identified any 
characteristic that yields variation in minimum quantities. Thus, the estimated minimum quantity is a 
constant, which means that the entire population is treated as the relevant target group. 
 
Unit cost parameters. Consider the estimated parameters for variables that affect unit costs, displayed 
in Table 3.5. These parameters form the basis for the price-adjusted equivalence scales in equation 
(2.16) and the construction of price indices in equation (2.6). We see that there is significant variation 
in unit costs in three of the service sectors: administration, primary education and health care. 
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Table 3.5 Estimates of unit cost parameters 
 Administration Primary education Health care 
Inverse population size 1.48 (8.77) 0.26 (8.25) 1.19 (6.53) 
Distance to municipal sub-district center - - 0.16 (8.55) 0.28 (4.97) 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. Number of observations = 378. 
 
The estimated unit costs in these three service sectors are decreasing as a function of population size. 
The chosen functional form is the inverse population size, which captures that the decreasing function 
is convex and close to zero when population is sufficiently large. The positive impact of inverse 
population size on unit costs may originate from fixed costs in the operation of local governments. 
Significant parameter estimates for inverse population size are taken as proof of economies of scale. 
An important reason for smaller municipalities to have higher unit costs is that they use a larger share 
of resources on administration. Furthermore, class sizes are in general smaller in smaller 
municipalities, implying more teachers per student and therefore higher costs. Similarly, to maintain a 
basic capacity of primary physicians in smaller municipalities the physician-patient ratio becomes 
relatively large, which increases the unit cost. 
 
We also find that greater dispersion of the local settlement pattern increases unit costs in education and 
health care. The estimated positive relationships are interpreted as reflecting costs of providing 
services on a decentralized level. For example, when it comes to primary education, municipalities 
with a high dispersion of settlement tend to supply a decentralized school structure with relatively few 
students per school and rather small class sizes. The aim is to provide a school structure that does not 
impose unreasonable travelling distances on the school children. Similarly, patients in primary health 
care are also entitled to have a physician within reasonable travelling distance. The costs to maintain 
such services are therefore higher in sparsely populated areas. To capture dispersion of settlement in 
the municipality, we use an explanatory variable defined as the average distance to the centre of the 
municipal sub-district. Note that the distance variable has no significant effect in the administration 
sector. 
 
The price indices defined in equation (2.6) reflect the relative differences across municipalities in unit 
costs for providing different services. Summary statistics for the estimated price indices are reported in 
Table 3.6. Note that the mean values are above 1 because municipalities with different population 
sizes are given equal weights, which means that weights per capita are higher in smaller 
municipalities. Small municipalities are found to encounter high unit costs due to economies of scale 
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and dispersed settlement. Moreover, we find large variation across municipalities in unit costs, 
particularly in administration and health care. 
 
Table 3.6 Variation in unit costs across municipalities 
 Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Administration 1.41 0.64 0.87 7.85 
Primary education 1.13 0.17 0.94 2.52 
Health care 1.43 0.58 0.83 6.37 
Note: Number of observations = 431. 
3.3 Allocating local public services 
In line with the allocation rule in equation (2.9), we use the above estimates to allocate the values of 
local public services to individuals. We assume that people who live in the same municipality and 
belong to the same target group, receive equal non-cash income. Specifically, the in-kind transfer from 
sector i received by each member of group j is then given by the estimate of iju , which may vary 
across municipalities. Thus, variation in allocated in-kind benefits across people is partly due to 
differences in individual characteristics that trigger expenditure needs. In addition, there is variation in 
local government spending across service sectors, as well as in spending priorities on different target 
groups.  
 
The target groups that are treated as recipients in the analysis may deviate from the group of actual 
recipients. There are two reasons for this. First, we usually do not observe the group of actual 
recipients. Hence, the identified target groups serve to approximate groups of actual recipients. 
Although the simulated recipients are not necessarily the same as the actual recipients, a good 
approximation of the underlying distributional profiles of public services should be obtained, provided 
that the relevant characteristics of recipients are taken into account.6 Second, in line with Smeeding et 
al. (1993), the services child protection, social assistance, health care, and long-term care are viewed 
as insurance benefits received by everyone covered by the insurance scheme, regardless of actual use. 
The received expenditure of such services is interpreted as expected non-cash income, which depends 
on the risk of becoming a recipient. Risk factors are accounted for by the characteristics of target 
groups that are assumed to receive the different services. 
                                                     
6 In the child care sector we also utilize additional information about coverage in kindergartens on the municipal level. 
Estimated recipient probabilities in different target groups are used to draw the correct number of recipients for each 
municipality. Local public expenditure on child care is allocated equally to the simulated recipients. 
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3.4 Equivalent income definitions 
When analyzing poverty and inequality among households of varying size and composition, it is 
necessary to adjust the measure of income to enable comparison across individuals. As discussed 
above, interpersonal comparison of income is typically achieved by using equivalence scales. We 
consider four different definitions of equivalent income, depending on whether we consider cash or 
extended income and how we adjust for differences in needs for non-cash income. The different 
definitions of equivalent income are displayed in Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7 Alternative definitions of equivalent income 
Equivalent income  Income measure Equivalence scale 
Cash income (EU) Cash income EU scale  
Extended income (EU) Extended income EU scale 
Extended income (NA) Extended income Needs-adjusted EU scale 
Extended income (NPA) Extended income Needs- and price-adjusted EU scale  
 
Following the previous literature in inequality and poverty closely, we use the EU scale to adjust for 
differences in cash income needs. This yields the measure of equivalent cash income, which typically 
forms the basis for studies of poverty and inequality. To obtain the measure of extended income, we 
add non-cash income to cash income. In line with previous studies, we use the same scale to adjust for 
needs for extended income as is used to adjust cash income. Consequently, extended income is 
adjusted by the EU scale. Thus, the first step is to change the income measure without changing the 
equivalence scale. The second step is to change the equivalence scale for extended income by taking 
into account the needs for public services of different target groups. Needs-adjusted extended 
equivalent income is derived by using the NA scale from Section 2.3 to adjust for differences in needs. 
The NA scale is a weighted average of the EU scale for cash income and the NC scale for non-cash 
income. The NA scale assumes that the sector-specific price indices are constant across municipalities, 
which is a special case of the NPA scale defined in equation (2.19). Thus, the third step is to introduce 
price adjustment in the equivalence scale, so the needs adjustment is based on the NPA scale, which 
yields needs- and price-adjusted extended equivalent income. 
 
In order to empirically implement the NA and NPA scales, it is necessary to assign a value to the 
weight rθ  given to cash income, defined in equation (2.19). In particular, we set the minimum 
quantity of cash income for the reference group, 0rγ , equal to the minimum pension entitlement for a 
single person in the social security system. By doing so, we are assuming that the minimum pension 
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for single pensioners equals the minimum quantity of cash income required for single adults below 67 
years of age, i.e. the reference group used in the NA and NPA scales. We then estimate that rθ  should 
be 0.95. As a robustness check, we have set 0rγ  equal to the EU poverty threshold derived from the 
equivalent cash income in the entire population. As the poverty threshold nearly equals the minimum 
pension entitlement for singles, our estimates of rθ  barely move. Therefore, we only report the results 
where the minimum pension is used to determine rθ .  
3.5 Measuring inequality and poverty 
Inequality measures. To summarize the informational content of the Lorenz curve and to achieve 
rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves, the conventional approach is to employ the Gini-coefficient. 
To examine the extent to which the empirical results depend on the choice of inequality measure, the 
Gini-coefficient is typically complemented with measures from the Atkinson or Theil family. 
However, the Gini-coefficient and inequality measures from the Atkinson or the Theil family have 
distinct theoretical foundations which make it inherently difficult to evaluate their capacities as 
complimentary measures of inequality. As demonstrated by Aaberge (2007), an alternative approach 
for examining inequality in the distribution of income is to rely on Gini’s Nuclear Family defined by 
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where C1 is equivalent to a measure of inequality that was proposed by Bonferroni (1930), whilst C2 is 
the Gini coefficient. As demonstrated by Aaberge (2000, 2007) C1 exhibits strong downside inequality 
aversion and is particularly sensitive to changes that concern the poor part of the population, whilst C2 
normally pays more attention to changes that take place in the middle part of the income distribution. 
The C3-coefficient exhibits upside inequality aversion and is thus particularly sensitive to changes that 
occur in the upper part of the income distribution. In this paper, we will examine the sensitivity of the 
empirical results to the choice of inequality measure by complementing the information provided by 
C2 with its two close relatives C1 and C3. Hence, we meet the most common criticism of the Gini-
coefficient, namely that it is insensitive to redistribution of income at the lower end of the distribution. 
 
Poverty thresholds. We follow common practice in most developed countries and specify a set of 
poverty thresholds as a certain fraction of the median income. Specifically, we will focus on a set of 
poverty thresholds defined as 60 per cent of the median of the chosen measure of income. Recognizing 
the inherent arbitrariness of specifying an exact poverty threshold, it can be instructive to apply other 
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thresholds to evaluate the robustness of the results. Moreover, by applying multiple thresholds one can 
obtain a fuller picture of the problem of poverty in a society. Thus we will supplement the analysis 
with poverty thresholds defined as 50 percent of the median of the chosen measure of income.7 
4. Distributional impact of public services 
This section examines the impact on inequality and poverty estimates of accounting for non-cash 
income from local public services, and, moreover, adjusting for differences in needs for such services 
across individuals. 
4.1 Main results 
Overall inequality and poverty. Table 4.1 reports the income shares by decile for each measure of 
equivalent income outlined in Table 3.7. As the distribution of income may vary substantially within 
each decile group, we need to be cautious in drawing firm conclusions from Table 4.1 about the 
distributional impact of public services. With this caveat in mind, the second column indicates that 
local public spending is quite redistributive, given the cash income shares reported in the first column. 
We find that the income shares increase in lower decile groups and decrease in higher decile groups 
when non-cash income is added to cash income. However, the third column suggests that substituting 
the EU-scale with the NA-scale in the needs-adjustment of extended income offsets some of the 
redistributional impact of public services. The final column shows that price-adjustment appear to 
have little impact on how needs-adjusted extended equivalent income is distributed across the decile 
groups. 
 
To investigate further the distributional impact of public services, the upper panel of Table 4.2 
employs the inequality measures outlined above. When comparing the first and the second column, we 
see that including non-cash income reduces inequality by about 15 percent. This suggests that public 
services are targeted toward individuals with relatively low cash income. However, as is clear from the 
third column, using our method to adjust for differences in needs offset about two-third of the 
inequality reduction stemming from the inclusion of non-cash income. Hence, the method used to 
make needs adjustment appears to be fairly important when drawing lessons about the redistributive 
nature of public services. Finally, column five demonstrates that allowing for variation across 
municipalities in unit costs for producing public services has little impact on inequality.  
                                                     
7 Following official poverty statistics in Norway and several other developed countries, students and wealthy individuals are 
not counted as poor. Because we lack credible data on wealth, an individual is classified as wealthy if he or she is 
registered with equivalent gross financial capital greater than three times the median equivalent cash income. 
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Table 4.1 Income shares by deciles for different income measures 
Income share by decile (%) 
Cash income Extended income Decile 
EU EU NA NPA 
1st 3.7 4.4 4.1 4.1 
2nd 6.0 6.7 6.3 6.3 
3rd 7.1 7.7 7.2 7.2 
4th 8.0 8.5 8.0 8.0 
5th 8.8 9.2 8.8 8.8 
6th 9.6 9.8 9.6 9.6 
7th 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
8th  11.6 11.4 11.6 11.6 
9th 13.3 12.7 13.3 13.3 
10th 21.2 19.2 20.5 20.6 
Overall mean 32 317 38 308 31 136 31 146 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted EU scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted EU scale. Income is reported in 
Euros (exchange rate of 9 NOK per Euro is used). 
 
Table 4.2 Inequality and poverty by income measure 
Inequality Relative reduction in inequality (%)
Cash income Extended income Extended income Indicator 
EU EU NA NPA EU NA NPA 
Bonferroni )( 1C  0.358 0.308 0.338 0.339 14.0 5.6 5.3 
Gini )( 2C  0.246 0.206 0.233 0.234 16.3 5.3 4.9 
3C  0.199 0.165 0.189 0.190 17.1 5.0 4.5 
Poverty incidence (%) Relative reduction in poverty (%) 
Cash income Extended income Extended income Threshold  (% of median) 
EU EU NA NPA EU NA NPA 
50  5.1 3.4 4.2 4.2 33.3 17.6 17.6 
60  9.5 6.9 7.2 7.1 27.4 24.2 25.3 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted EU scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted EU scale. The three inequality 
measures are calculated for each of the four equivalent income distributions. Poverty thresholds are 
calculated on the basis of median in each of the four income distributions. For each income measure, 
the relative reduction in inequality/poverty is given as the per cent decrease compared to 
inequality/poverty when cash income is used.   
 
When comparing rows 1-3, we see that the findings are fairly robust to the choice of inequality 
measure. Interestingly, the inequality measure that is most sensitive to changes in the lower part of the 
distribution, C1, records the smallest (percentage) reduction when applying the EU scale to extended 
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income. However, the picture is reversed when using the NA or the NPA scale, in which case C1 
records the largest (percentage) decrease in inequality. This illustrates that redistribution of extended 
income at the lower end of the distribution plays a more important role when using our method to 
adjust for differences in needs.  
 
The lower panel of Table 4.2 shows the share of the population with income below the poverty line 
according to the different definitions of income. We see that poverty rates are reduced by almost one-
third, when we consider extended income instead of the conventional cash income measure. However, 
using our method to adjust for differences in needs offsets some of the poverty reduction, in particular 
when the relatively low poverty threshold of 50 percent of the median is used. This indicates that there 
is a concentration of individuals with low cash income who have relatively high needs for public 
services, which is ignored when one uses the EU scale to adjust extended income. Just as for the 
inequality estimates, allowing for variation across municipalities in unit costs for producing public 
services has little impact on poverty incidence. 
 
Poverty profile. Below, we investigate the impact of public services on the poverty profile. For 
brevity, we only report results using a poverty threshold of 60 percent of the median.  
 
Table 4.3 shows the effect of accounting for local public services on poverty rates by household type. 
When focusing on cash income, the poverty rates are rather high among elderly (mostly female) living 
in single person households, due to the fact that the poverty thresholds exceed the guaranteed 
minimum pension. However, as elderly people receive a high level of publicly provided care and 
health services, their poverty rates drop radically when we focus on extended income. The same is true 
for households with children, especially single parents, since they are major recipients of services such 
as education and child care. For these subgroups, however, the poverty rates rise again when we use 
our method to adjust for differences in needs. Due to the age structure and the relatively high fertility 
rate of Non-Western immigrants, their poverty rates also decline considerably when non-cash income 
are taken into account. The relatively high levels of non-cash income also reflect higher needs for 
public services, as their poverty rates rise again when we make needs adjustment according to the NA 
scale. The groups that receive the least non-cash income are singles and couples without children in 
the pre-retirement phase. The poverty rates for these households therefore increase when we consider 
extended income. However, their poverty rates fall when we use our method to adjust for needs. This 
finding comes as no surprise, as these households have no children who need child care or education, 
and their need for publicly provided long-term care is small. 
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Table 4.3 also shows poverty incidence by centrality. The results show that incorporating public 
services into the income measure reduces the poverty rates in rural areas relative to urban areas and, 
especially, compared to Oslo. When we use our method to adjust for differences in needs, a similar 
pattern appears: While the poverty rate in rural areas is unchanged, we see that poverty rates rise again 
in urban areas (especially Oslo). This indicates that public transfers targeted towards individuals living 
in urban areas often reflect higher needs. 
 
Table 4.3 Poverty profile in different population groups by income measure 
Poverty incidence 
Cash income Extended income Population group Population share 
EU EU NA NPA 
29 years or below 3.3 21.4 26.6 18.9 18.8 
30-44 years 3.9 15.8 21.6 13.5 13.5 
45-66 years 5.0 18.2 27.6 12.4 12.4 
Singles 
67 years or above 5.7 45.8 27.7 27.2 27.2 
29 years or below 1.3 4.4 5.9 4.1 4.1 
30-44 years 1.9 3.7 4.7 3.5 3.5 
45-66 years 8.6 2.8 4.6 2.0 2.0 
Couples 
(without 
children) 
67 years or above 7.0 9.1 5.3 5.0 5.0 
0-5 years 18.8 6.9 1.8 6.7 6.7 
6-17 years 21.7 2.9 0.9 2.5 2.5 
Couples 
(with 
children) 18 years or above 8.7 1.4 1.8 1.1 1.1 
0-5 years 1.8 29.2 5.3 24.3 24.1 
6-17 years 4.8 12.3 2.6 9.2 9.1 Single parents 
18 years or above 2.5 6.8 8.4 5.7 5.7 
Other households 5.0 6.2 4.2 5.5 5.5 
Non-immigrants 91.1 8.0 6.2 5.6 5.6 
Immigrants 8.9 24.9 14.2 23.1 22.9 
 Western 2.3 16.6 15.1 14.5 14,4 
Ethnic 
origin 
 Non-Western 6.6 27.8 13.9 26.1 25,7 
Urban 81.7 9.4 7.1 7.4 7.3 
 Oslo 11.7 13.1 9.3 10.6 10.5 Centrality 
Rural 18.3 10.1 6.4 6.4 6.7 
All population 100 9.5 6.9 7.2 7.1 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted EU scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted EU scale. Poverty thresholds are 
calculated as 60 percent of the median in each of the four income distributions. 
 
28 
Figure 4.1 Changes in poverty status for alternative income measures 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted EU scale. Poverty thresholds are 
calculated as 60 percent of the median in each of the three 
income distributions. 
 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the degree of overlap in individuals’ poverty status when changing the 
measure of equivalent income. We immediately see that accounting for the value of non-cash income 
and the method used to adjust for differences in needs not only change the poverty rate, but also which 
individuals that are classified as poor. Specifically, only 4.2 percentage points are poor according to all 
three income measures. The overlap in poverty status is largest between cash income and the extended 
income measure using our method for needs adjustment.  
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
Balanced budget. In the analysis above, we have followed standard practice in empirical analysis of 
the distributional impact of public services in disregarding that the cost of their provision may differ 
from the direct taxes levied on individuals and households.8 In principle, if we include the value of 
public services we should also take into account the associated cost borne by the individuals. A 
possible concern is, therefore, that the direct taxes and the public expenditure on cash benefits and 
public services may not balance out at the aggregate level. Table 4.4 displays the aggregated direct 
taxes and public expenditure on cash benefits and public services in the ten service sector under study. 
We see that direct taxes fall short of covering public expenditure, producing a deficit of about 8.7 
million Euros.  
                                                     
8 A notable exception is Garfinkel et al. (2006), who try to balance the expenditure on public services and the tax revenues.   
29 
Table 4.4 Aggregate direct taxes and expenditure on cash benefits and public services 
Budget component Euros (in million) 
Direct taxes 33 551 
–    Cash benefits 28 743 
–    Expenditure on public services 13 549 
= Surplus - 8 741 
 
In practice, it is difficult to assess whether an analysis of the distributional impact of public services 
can be given a balanced budget interpretation. This is primarily because the revenue and expenditure 
side of government budgets are detached, in the sense that particular components of expenditure are 
not tied to particular sources of revenue. Thus, it is not clear which type of expenditure is financed by 
which type of revenue. Moreover, the statutory burden of a tax does not necessarily describe who 
actually bears the burden of it. For example, Gruber (2005) argues that empirical evidence generally 
suggests that income taxes are borne by the households that pay them, payroll taxes are borne by 
workers regardless of statutory incidence, indirect taxes are shifted towards prices, and corporate taxes 
are in part shifted forward to the owners of capital but also borne by consumers and workers.  
 
On the one hand, a balanced budget interpretation of the results reported in Tables 4.1-4.3 may be 
justified if the economic burden of the deficit is already reflected in individuals’ observed cash 
income. In that case, the above analysis takes into account both the value of public services and the 
associated cost born by the individuals. This could be the case if employers’ payroll taxes finance the 
deficit, and workers bear the burden of such payroll taxes through lower wages. Alternatively, the 
deficit may be financed by corporate taxes, which could be fully shifted towards individuals’ returns 
from capital income. In addition, a balanced budget interpretation can be rationalized if someone 
besides the individuals finances the deficit, like the large Norwegian petroleum fund. 
 
On the other hand, a balanced budget interpretation of the results reported in Tables 4.1-4.3 is 
problematic if the deficit was, in fact, financed by indirect taxes on private goods. In that case, the 
above analysis includes the value of public service, but not fully the associated cost born by the 
individuals. As robustness check, we therefore assume that the deficit is fully born by individuals 
through value-added taxes (VAT) on private goods. In Norway, VAT on private goods is generally 
about 25 %, generating as much as 21 million Euros in public revenues in 2007. Mirroring the 
proportional nature of VAT, it is necessary to deduct 8 percent from the cash income of each 
individual to finance the deficit of 8.7 million Euros. Table 4.5 reports the inequality and poverty 
results after deducing a proportional tax of 8 percent from individuals’ cash income. Since our poverty 
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and inequality measures are scale invariant with respect to the chosen income measure, we know a 
priori that the estimates based on cash income are unaffected. However, this argument does not hold 
true when extended income forms the basis for the analysis, since it is the sum of cash and non-cash 
income. It is, therefore, reassuring to find that the poverty and inequality estimates based on extended 
income barely move when the proportional tax on individual cash income is introduced. Thus, the 
results are robust to alternative assumptions about how public spending is financed.  
 
Table 4.5  Inequality and poverty by income measure, assuming that value-added taxes finance 
the deficit 
Inequality Relative reduction in inequality (%)
Cash income Extended income Extended income Indicator 
EU EU NA NPA EU NA NPA 
Bonferroni )( 1C  0.358 0.306 0.333 0.333 14.5 7.0 7.0 
Gini )( 2C  0.246 0.205 0.229 0.230 16.7 6.9 6.5 
3C  0.199 0.164 0.186 0.186 17.6 6.5 6.5 
Poverty incidence (%) Relative reduction in poverty (%) 
Cash income Extended income Extended income Threshold  (% of median) 
EU EU NA NPA EU NA NPA 
50  5.0 3.4 4.0 4.0 33.3 20.6 21.0 
60  9.5 6.9 6.8 6.8 26.9 28.0 28.3 
Note: All individuals are deducted 8 percent of their cash income. NA: Needs-adjusted EU scale. 
NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted EU scale. The three inequality measures are calculated for each of the 
four equivalent income distributions. Poverty thresholds are calculated on the basis of median in each 
of the four income distributions. For each income measure, the relative reduction in inequality/poverty 
is given as the percent decrease compared to inequality/poverty when cash income is used.   
 
Equivalence scale for cash income. Below, we discuss the results from a sensitivity analysis showing 
that our main findings about the distributional impact of public services are robust to the choice 
between two of the most used equivalence scales for cash income. While the results based on the EU 
scale are reported in Tables 4.1-4.3, Appendix B displays the findings based on the OECD scale.  
 
As shown in Table 4.6, the OECD scale gives the first adult the weight 1, with each additional adult 
given the weight 0.7 and each child the weight 0.5. Thus, the OECD scale places lower weight on 
economies of scale in consumption when considering household cash income compared to what the 
EU scale does. This implies that individuals from smaller households (singles or couples without 
children) would be evaluated as relatively better off when we use the OECD scale.  
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Table 4.6 Needs-adjusted EU and OECD scales by household size and age composition 
EU-scale OECD-scale 
Unadjusted Needs adjusted Unadjusted Needs adjusted 
No. of 
adults/ 
children 
Age, 
years 
1 adult 2 adults 1 adult 2 adults 1 adult 2 adults 1 adult 2 adults 
17-29 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.7 1 1.7 
30-44 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.7 1 1.7 
45-66 1 1.5 1 1.6 1 1.7 1 1.8 
67-79  1 1.5 1.1 1.9 1 1.7 1.1 2.0 
80-89 1 1.5 1.3 2.2 1 1.7 1.3 2.4 
No 
children 
90-   1 1.5 1.8 3.1 1 1.7 1.8 3.3 
0-5 1.3 1.8 1.5 2.0 1.5 2.2 1.6 2.4 
6-12 1.3 1.8 1.7 2.2 1.5 2.2 1.9 2.6 1 child 
13-16 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.4 1.5 2.2 2.1 2.8 
0-5  1.6 2.1 2.1 2.6 2 2.7 2.4 3.1 
2 children 
6-12 1.6 2.1 2.5 3.0 2 2.7 2.8 3.6 
0-5  1.9 2.4 2.7 3.3 2.5 3.2 3.3 4.0 
3 children 
6-12 1.9 2.4 3.1 3.8 2.5 3.2 3.8 4.5 
Note: The EU scale with needs adjustment is a weighted average of the unadjusted EU scale and a 
needs scale for non-cash income (both defined on a household level). Similarly, the OECD scale with 
needs adjustment is a weighted average of the unadjusted OECD scale and a needs scale for non-cash 
income. The needs adjusted EU/OECD scales take account of both differences in household size and 
differences in needs for public services across households. In Table 4.6, households are categorized 
according to household size and age group of the youngest member in the household (for households 
without children, this corresponds to the youngest adult). Table 4.6 presents averages of the estimated 
needs adjusted EU/OECD scales for different households. 
 
The choice between OECD and EU scale for cash income also matters for the NA scale, defined in 
equation (2.17), since it is a weighted average of the chosen scale for cash income and the NC scale 
for public services. Table 4.6 provides a comparison of the NA scales for the two choices of 
equivalence scales for cash income. Compared to both the EU and OECD scale, we see that the NA 
scales are relatively high for the elderly and households with two or more children, capturing that the 
needs for public services are particularly high in these groups. Moreover, the differences between the 
two NA scales mirror the differences between the OECD and the EU scales.  
 
As demonstrated in Tables 4.2 and B.2, the choice between the EU and the OECD scale affects the 
level of poverty. Because the OECD scale assigns less weight to economies of scale within 
households, the relative high incidence of low income among the smaller households implies higher 
overall poverty when using the EU scale instead of the OECD scale. It is also evident that the 
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inequality estimates are slightly higher when we use the EU scale. But more importantly, we see that 
our main conclusions about the distributional impact of public services are robust to whether we let the 
EU or the OECD scale form the basis of the analysis. Including non-cash income reduce income 
inequality by around 15-20 percent and poverty rates by more than one-third, irrespective of whether 
we use the EU or the OECD scale. Moreover, adjusting for differences in needs for public services 
across population subgroups offsets much of the inequality reduction and some of the poverty 
decrease. However, Tables 4.3 and B.3 reveal that the impact of public services on the poverty profile 
differs somewhat depending on the scale used for some household groups. This mostly pertains to the 
poverty rates of singles and couples without children below 67 years of age.  
5. Conclusion 
As emphasized by Atkinson et al. (2002, p 103): “As the level and distribution of individual services 
does affect comparisons across households and across countries where the extent of state provision 
differs, social transfers in kind should in principle be included in the definition of income”. Most 
empirical studies of inequality and poverty, however, focus exclusively on cash income and omit the 
value of public services, which is worrisome given that about half of welfare state transfers in 
developed countries are in-kind (Garfinkel et al., 2006).  
 
Over the last few decades, a number of studies have addressed this issue, investigating the impact on 
poverty and inequality estimates of extending the income measure with non-cash income from public 
services. While these studies represent a significant step forward, a concern is that they use 
equivalence scales designed to account for economies of scale and differences in needs for cash 
income, which are not necessarily appropriate when analyzing extended income. For instance, the 
elderly tend to utilize health services more often than younger people due to different health status, 
and children have a genuine need for education. Hence, the economic resources of groups with high 
needs for public services might be overestimated.  
 
A contribution of our paper is to relax the assumption that the relative needs of different subgroups 
remain unchanged when the definition of income is extended to include non-cash income. We also 
departure from previous studies in that the valuation of public services, identification of target groups, 
allocation of expenditures to target groups, and adjustment for differences in needs are all derived 
from the same model of local government spending behaviour. This theory-based framework provides 
a coherent method for evaluating the distributional impact of public services. In particular, our 
approach ensures internal consistency between the methods used for allocation and needs-adjustment. 
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Combining administrative registers and municipal accounting data from Norway, we apply the 
proposed method to examine empirically the distributional impact of public services. The main 
insights from the empirical analysis may be summarized in four conclusions. First, including non-cash 
income reduces income inequality by about 15 percent and poverty rates by almost one-third. Second, 
adjusting for differences in needs for public services across population subgroups offsets about half of 
the inequality reduction and some of the poverty decrease. Third, accounting for the value of non-cash 
income and adjusting for differences in needs for public services not only change the poverty rate, but 
also the type of individuals that are classified as poor. And fourth, allowing for differences between 
municipalities in unit costs for providing public services does not change the picture of inequality and 
poverty. 
 
Whether these findings extend to other countries is an open question. However, the proposed 
framework for evaluating the distributional impact of public services might be employed also in at 
least some other countries, since it does not require information about spending on individual level or 
on specific target groups. All that is required is detailed knowledge about institutional features of the 
public service provision in the country of study, information on sector-specific expenditure by region, 
as well as sufficiently rich micro data, like censuses, to compute the socio-economic characteristics of 
the population in the various regions and to perform the distributional analysis. 
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Appendix A 
Estimation of marginal budget share parameters 
Table A.1 Estimates of marginal budget share parameters 
Variable Service sector: Administration 
Primary 
education 
Other 
education Child care Health care 
Constant 0.226 (8.53) 
0.091 
(2.55) 
-0.007 
(-0.76) 
-0.005 
(-0.26) 
0.046 
(2.24) 
Average education 
level for persons 30-59 
years 
-0.035 
(-3.66) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
0.009 
(2.68) 
0.018 
(2.92) 
-0.003 
(-0.38) 
Share of socialists in 
municipal council 
0.009 
(0.53) 
0.002 
(0.08) 
0.008 
(1.07) 
-0.021 
(-1.52) 
0.014 
(1.18) 
Share of population in 
densely populated areas 
0.001 
(0.12) 
0.021 
(1.46) 
0.000 
(-0.06) 
0.005 
(0.56) 
0.017 
(2.48) 
Variable Service sector: 
Social 
assistance Child protection 
Long-term 
care Culture Infrastructure 
Constant -0.018 (-1.50) 
-0.017 
(-1.42) 
0.329 
(5.52) 
0.027 
(1.63) 
0.140 
(4.00) 
Average education 
level for persons 30-59 
years 
0.008 
(1.62) 
0.009 
(1.77) 
-0.043 
(-1.89) 
0.018 
(3.21) 
-0.005 
(-0.43) 
Share of socialists in 
municipal council 
0.016 
(1.79) 
0.012 
(1.29) 
-0.015 
(-0.37) 
-0.025 
(-2.42) 
0.064 
(2.64) 
Share of population in 
densely populated areas 
0.005 
(0.87) 
0.002 
(0.27) 
0.025 
(1.15) 
0.011 
(1.40) 
-0.073 
(-4.13) 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. Number of observations = 378. 
 
Table A.1 displays the estimated coefficients of the marginal budget shares as specified in equation 
(2.7). The parameters in Table A.1 are estimated simultaneously with the parameters in Tables 3.3 and 
3.4 by the method of maximum likelihood. Note that marginal budget share coefficients for the 
residual sector, net operating result, can be derived from the coefficients in Table A.1, and from the 
constraints which secure that the sum of marginal budget shares over all sectors is equal to 1. It is 
found that the marginal budget shares are affected by education level, share of socialist representatives 
in the municipal council and population density. The higher the education level, the stronger are the 
local government preferences for child care services, other education and culture, while the priority of 
administration is low in well educated communities. It is found that socialist parties give high priority 
to infrastructure and low priority to culture and net operating result. Municipalities with high 
population density give high priority to health care and low priority to infrastructure. 
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Appendix B 
Results based on the OECD scale 
Table B.1 Income shares by deciles for different income measures, OECD-scale 
Income share by decile (%) 
Cash income Extended income Decile 
OECD OECD NA NPA 
1st 3.8 4.8 4.3 4.3 
2nd 6.2 7.0 6.5 6.5 
3rd 7.1 7.8 7.3 7.3 
4th 7.9 8.4 8.0 8.0 
5th 8.7 9.0 8.7 8.7 
6th 9.5 9.7 9.5 9.5 
7th 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.4 
8th  11.6 11.2 11.5 11.6 
9th 13.4 12.5 13.2 13.3 
10th 21.4 19.2 20.6 20.6 
Overall mean 27 202 32 072 27 310 27 318 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted OECD scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted OECD scale. Income is reported in 
Euros (exchange rate of 9 NOK per Euro is used). 
 
Table B.2 Inequality and poverty by income measures, OECD-scale  
Inequality Relative reduction in inequality (%) 
Cash income Extended income Extended income Indicator 
OECD OECD NA NPA OECD NA NPA 
Bonferroni )( 1C  0.356 0.291 0.331 0.332 18.3 7.0 6.7 
Gini )( 2C  0.246 0.197 0.230 0.231 19.9 6.5 6.1 
3C  0.200 0.160 0.187 0.188 20.0 6.5 6.0 
Poverty incidence (%) Relative reduction in poverty (%)  
Cash income Extended income Extended income Threshold  (% of median) 
OECD OECD NA NPA OECD NA NPA 
40  2.6 1.6 2.5 2.5 38.5 3.8 3.8 
50 4.3 2.4 3.9 3.9 44.2 9.3 9.3 
60  7.9 4.3 5.8 5.8 45.6 26.6 26.6 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted OECD scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted OECD scale. The three inequality 
measures are calculated for each of the four equivalent income distributions. Poverty thresholds are calculated on 
the basis of median in each of the four equivalent income distributions. For each income measure, the relative 
reduction in inequality/poverty is given as the per cent decrease compared to inequality/poverty when cash 
income is used.   
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Table B.3 Poverty incidence for different population groups, OECD-scale 
Poverty incidence 
Cash income Extended income Population group Population share 
OECD OECD NA NPA 
29 years or below 3.3 12.4 13.3 14.0 14.0 
30-44 years 3.9 7.8 8.5 9.6 9.6 
45-66 years 5.0 5.9 6.9 6.6 6.6 
Singles 
67 years or above 5.7 8.8 6.3 8.1 8.1 
29 years or below 1.3 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.9 
30-44 years 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.5 
45-66 years 8.6 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 
Couples 
(without 
children) 
67 years or above 7.0 3.9 1.7 2.2 2.2 
0-5 years 18.8 5.0 0.9 4.1 4.1 
6-17 years 21.7 2.0 0.5 1.7 1.7 
Couples 
(with 
children) 18 years or above 8.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0-5 years 1.8 17.3 2.1 10.7 10.6 
6-17 years 4.8 6.1 1.1 4.3 4.3 Single parents 
18 years or above 2.5 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.7 
Other households 5.0 4.0 2.0 3.8 3.8 
Non-immigrants 91.1 3.0 1.8 2.8 2.8 
Immigrants 8.9 17.4 8.4 15.3 15.1 
 Western 2.3 11.8 9.9 11.5 11.5 
Ethnic 
origin 
 Non-Western 6.6 19.3 7.9 16.7 16.4 
Urban 81.7 4.4 2.6 4.1 4.1 
 Oslo 11.7 8.0 4.6 7.0 6.9 Centrality 
Rural 18.3 3.6 1.7 2.8 2.8 
All population 100 4.3 2.4 3.9 3.9 
Note: All numbers are in per cent. NA: Needs-adjusted OECD scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted OECD 
scale. Poverty thresholds are calculated on the basis of median in each of the four equivalent income 
distributions, and thereby depend upon the income measure and the scales used in calculating equivalent 
incomes.  
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Figure B.1 Changes in poverty status for alternative income  
 measures, OECD-scale 
 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted OECD scale. Poverty thresholds are 
calculated as 50 per cent of the median in each of the three income 
distributions. 
 
